The paper describes the background for my original "hedonics" paper (Griliches 1961) and discusses some of the issues raised by the subsequent literature on this range of topics. It goes on to consider some of the implications of this work for the measurement of capital services and connects it to the Jorgenson-Griliches (1967) paper on the "explanation of productivity change." It reviews the criticisms made against that paper, especially the use of a utilization adjustment, and finds itself, perhaps unsurprisingly, still in sympathy with its major thrust. It also cautions against interpreting the recent slowdown in the growth of total factor productivity as implying, necessarily, a parallel slowdown in the technological potential of the economy.
itself was not particularily original, What was impressive about that paper is that it took the idea seriously, did a lot of work with it and showed that something interesting can indeed be accomplished this way. Showing that something interesting is actually doable had a significant impact on the subsequent literature, generating much new work in this style and also quite a bit of theoretical controversy and elaboration. But I am running ahead of my story.
There were two influences, two lines of research that led me to work on this problem. In my thesis on hybrid corn (Griliches 1956 and l957b) I had studied the diffusion of an innovation as it was affected by various economic forces. Central to that work was the concept of a diffusion curve or path, I had used the logistic for this purpose, in which "time" is essentially exogenous (as it was also to be in the concurrent and subsequent theories of technological change). The model specified an adjustment path to the new equilibrium, but the equilibrium level itself, the "ceiling" level for the new technology, was fixed and unchanging over time (though I allowed it to differ cross-sectionally). I was not entirely happy with such a formulation and had already explored in an appendix to my thesis an alternative model which made the rate of adoption a direct function of profitability with improvements in the "quality" of the technology (rising relative yields of hybrid versus open pollinated corn) and the fall in its price as its major driving forces. The arrival of partial-adjustment distributed-lag models at Chicago via Cagan (1956) and Theil (who had brought Koyck's 1954 model to Nerlove's and my 3 attention] led me to try them as an alternative framework for the analysis of technical change in my work on the demand for fertilizer in agriculture (Criliches 1958a) . That work interpreted the growth in fertilizer use as a lagged response to the continued decline in its real price. For that I needed, however, a reasonable price series and I was not satisfied with the official USDA price index on this topic. The "quality" of the fertilizers used was changing rapidly, the use of nitrogen was increasing relative to the other components, and the official price series were not capturing it adequately. Ac alternative was available to me in the form of a series of "total plant nutrients used" and an estimate of the average price per plant nutrient unit could be derived from it and the total fertilizer expenditure series. But that series gave equal weight to each of the three major plant nutrients [nitrogen N, phosphoric acid P, and potash K] which looked wrong to me. It was then that I ran my first "hedonic" regression, though I did not know its name at that point [in 1957 ], relating the prices of different mixed fertilizers to their "formula", the mix of their ingredients, to derive better weights for the construction of a total "constant quality" fertilizer quantity and price series. This regression, which yielded 3.5, 2, and 1 as the approximate "correct" weights for the three major plant nutrients [N, P, and K] instead of the equal weights implicit in the total plant nutrients concept, is buried in a footnote in the final published version (Griliches 1958a, p. 599) .
I had not realized yet what was going to sprout from it in the future.
The other line of work that merged with it was the direct measurement of "technological change" using output over input indexes. This 1ir was based on earlier work in agriculture by Barton and Cooper (1948) , was summarized for me by Schultz (1953) , and had been pursued at Chicago by Ruttan (1954 and 1957) , before the topic was transformed by Solow's (1957) elegant reformulation and its subsequent elaboration by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) .
Similar work had been done in industry by Schmookler (1952) and Abrajnovitz (1956) , among others. The stylized facts that had emerged were quite clear. The lion's share of the observed growth in output was attributable to "technical change," or more correctly, to the "residual."
Having come to this problem with a background in econometrics, I had used
Schultz's numbers to estimate the social returns to public investments in agricultural research (Griliches l958b), I found the spectacle of economic models yielding large residuals rather uncomfortable, even when we fudged the issue by renaming them as "technical change" and then claiming credit for their "measurement." My interest in specification analysis (Griliches 1957a ) led me to a series of questions about the model used to compute such "residuals" and also, especially, about the ingredients, the data, used in its implementation.
This led me to a research program which focused on the various components of such computations and alternatives to them: the measurement of the services of capital equipment items and the issues of deflation, quality change, and the measurement of a relevant depreciation concept; the measurement of labor input and the contribution of education to its changing quality; the role of "leftout" variables linputs] such as public and private investments in R&D; and formula misspecification issues, especially economies of scale and other sources of disequilibria, which led me to a continued involvement with production function estimation. This program of research, which was anounced, implicitely, in my "Measuring Inputs in Agriculture" (Griliches 1960) paper and found its most full expression in my two papers on agricultural 4 productivity (Griliches 1963 and l964a) , served me rather well in subsequent years and to this date. It was in certain aspects rather similar to the task pursued by Denison (1962) at about the same time, except that I put more emphasis on its econometric aspects, on the explicit testing of the various proposed adjustments and "sources of growth" attributions.
It was in this context, when I turned to the examination how the various capital measures were being constructed and especially deflated, that I escalated my incipient efforts in agriculture into a more general Staff Report for the Stigler Committee (NBER 1961), resurecting thereby the "hedonic regression" approach to the measurement of quality change problem. This paper appeared at a rather opportune moment, just as data, computer resources, econometric training and sophistication, and general interest in this range of topics were all expanding, and a whole literature developed in its wake, influencing the measurement of real estate prices, wage equations, enviromental amenities, and other aspects of "qualitative differences". This literature has become to vast for one person to survey it. I tried to do so earlier on in its development in the introduction to the volume of essays on this topic edited by me (Griliches 1971) . More recent surveys can be found in Triplett (1975 and 1987) , Berndt (1983) , and Bartik and Smith (1987) . Here I
can only indicate what I consider to be a few of the highlights of this literature.
II
There are three major issues which tend to be addressed, in different proportions, in the "hedonic" literature. There is a range of theoretical questions: how should different "qualities," characteristics, of commodities (outputs or inputs) be modelled, entered into utility or cost functions and translated into demand and supply functions and the resulting market outcomes?
Can one give a theoretically consistent interpretation to "quality adjusted" The theoretical literature tends to focus either on the demand side, Lancaster (1966 Lancaster ( , 1971 , Muellbauer (1974) , and Berndt (1983) , among others, or the supply side (see Ohta, 1975 for an example), with very few, Rosen (1974) being a notable exemption, attempting a full general equilibrium discussion.
(See also Epple 1987 for a recent discussion.) There is much finger-pointing at the restrictive assumptions required to establish the "existence" and meaning of hedonic "guality or price indexes. (See, e.g., Muellbauer, 1974, and Lucas 1975.) While useful, I feel that this literature has misunderstood the original purpose of the hedonic suggestion. It is easy to show that except for unique circumstances and under very stringent assumptions it is not 6 7 possible to devise a perfect price index for commodity classification.
With finite amounts of data, different procedures will yield (hopefully not very) different answers, and even "good" formulae, such as Divisia-type indexes, cannot be given a satisfactory theoretical interpretation except in very limiting and unrealistic circumstances. Most of the objections to attempts to constri.ict a price index of automobiles from the consideration of their various attributes apply with the same force to the construction of a motor-vehicles price index out of the prices of cars, trucks, and motorcycles.
My own point of view is that what the hedonic approach tries to do is estimate aspects of the budget constraint facing consumers, allowing thereby the estimation of "missing" prices when quality changes. It is not in the business of estimating utility or cost functions per Se, though it can also be very useful for these purposes. (See Cardell 1977 , McFadden 1978 , and Trajtenberg 1983 for examples.) What is being estimated is actually the locus of intersections of the demand curves of different consumers with varying tastes and the supply functions of different producers with possibly varying technologies of production. One is unlikely, therefore, to be able to recover the underlying utility and cost functions from such data alone, except in very special circumstances. Nor can theoretical derivations at the individual level really provide substantive constraints on the estimation of such "market"
relations. (See the detailed discussion of many of these issues, in the context of estimating the value of urban amenities, in Bartik and Smith, 1987 .) Hence my preference for the "estimation of missing prices" interpretation of this approach. Accepting that, one still faces the usual index number problems and ambiguities but at least one is back to the "previous case". In this my views are close to those articulated by Triplett (1983 and . The following passage from Ohta and Criliches (1976, p.326 ) represents them reasonably well:
"Despite the theoretical proofs to the contrary, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) "exists" and is even of some use. It is thus of some value to attempt to improve it even if perfection is unattainable. What the hedonic approach attempted was to provide a tool for estimating "missing" prices, prices of particular bundles not observed in the original or later periods. It did not shifts across markets and time. My own work in this area has had more of a methodological-empirical flavor to it though there were also non-negligible attempts to formulate and clarify the theory underlying such measurement techniques in Adelman and Griliches (1961) , Griliches (1964b) and in Ohta and Griliches (1976 and . The last two papers represent also my efforts to pursue additional empirical work in this area. In the 1976 paper with Ohta we extended the earlier approach to the analysis of used automobile prices and investigated differences between performance and specification characteristics and pricing differences between manufacturers of different makes of automobiles. The 1986 paper focuses on the role of gasoline price changes in shifting the hedonic price relationships for cars, extends the theory to incorporate operating costs components, and shows that allowing for such price changes leaves the "extended" hedonic function effectively unchanged, permitting one to maintain the stability of tastes hypothesis in this market.
See also Gordon (1983) and Kahn (1986) for related work. The major recent "success" of hedonic methods has been their acceptance by the official statistical agencies after many years of resistance. Hedonic methods had been used for a long time by the Bureau of the Census to compute its index of single family houses and much experimental work was carried on at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but it was not until 'inuary 1986, when the Survey of Current Business announced a revision of the U.S. National Income Accounts which incorporated a new price index for computers based on the hedonic methodology, that one could feel that they had received the official to imprimatur. This index is described and discussed in Cole et al (1986) and Triplett (1986) . (See also Gordon 1988 for alternative computations.) It
It would be interesting to speculate why it has taken so long for these methods to penetrate into the "official" circles. This is not, of course, the first use of such methods by the statistical agencies. The Bureau of the Census has used hedonic methods for years in the construction of its residential housing price indexes and there has been significant experimental work with these methods at the BLS, by Gavett, Early and Sinclair, Triplett, and others. But the recent computer price indexes revision is the first time an agency has embraced these methods publicly in a significant way.
It is easy to forget how vehement the oposition was. One needs to go back to the 1962 and 1965 exchanges between Gilbert, Denison, Jaszi and myself to recapture the flavor of some of these arguments. (See Griliches 1962 and 1964b and the associated comments.) The objections could be caricatured as either saying that it couldn't be done, or it shouldn't be done, or it was already being done by the standard conventional methods. The fact that it is difficult to do, that an actual empirical implementation calls for much judgemenc on the part of the analyst and hence exposes him to the charge of subjectivity is still the most telling objection today. The fact that the standard procedures also involve much judgment and "ad-hockery" is usually wall hidden behind the official facade of the statistical establishment.
Hedonic methods are difficult. They require more data and more analysis and judgement. Their virtue is that they use more data and that they expose some of these judgements to the final user of the results, providing an implicit warning of their tenousness. Here, as everywhere else in economics, there is no free lunch.
11
The notion that one should stick only to "cost" based quality differentials was preposterous at the time and has been largely given up by its proponents. The difference between "resource" use and "utility" based quality adjustments was clarified in the debates between Gordon (1983) and Triplett (1983) and it is now well understood that both concepts make sense in different circumstances and that both are interesting and useful, especially when they do not coincide.
The notion that the statistical agencies where already doing all this under the guise of "linking" was largely wishful thinking though matters have improved greatly over the years. The problem was not that a detailed "all models" Divisia index would not come close to a hedonic regression result. It might even be superior to it. It was just that it was not being done. In part because the detailed data were not being collected and new products and new varieties of older products were not showing up in the indexes until it was much too late. The hedonic approach was one way of implementing what they should have been doing in the first place. It was also more willing to cary the "linking" idea further, across models that differed significantly in more than one dimension. It could not solve the really new product problem, a product whose uses and dimensions had no previous precedent or anticipation.
But it was willing to push comparisons much further than it had been done before, not giving up as easily in the face of a changing world. Buried within the hedonic idea was already the germ of Becker's (1965) "household production function" and the notion that one should look at the relevant activity as a whole, at its "ultimate" product in terms of utility or productivity, and not just at the individual components. In this sense, there remains still much to be done in this area. I don't think that we have actually been daring enough. We have not yet produced a decent price index of Thealth" nor have we done the simpler task of tracing thru the relevant history of the price of computation, from the days of the abacus, through the electric desk calculators of my student days [who remembers still the Marchants, Monroes, and Frieden's of yore?], the electronic main-frames of our youth, and the PC revolution of recent years. I think that it is doable and I believe that it is worth doing, whether we use the results to revise the national Income accounts or not.
III
The work on hedonic price indexes connected to my more general interest in the measurement of capital for the analysis of productivity change. A rather complete statement of my original position on this matter can be found in the Yehuda Grunfeld Memorial volume paper (Griliches, 1963) . This was to be refined later in the joint work with Jorgenson (Griliches and Jorgenson, 1966, and Griliches 1967) . The difficulty with the available capital measures then, and to a great extent still now, was, in my view, the fact that they were being over-deflated and over-depreciated, that items with different expected lives were being added together in a wrong way, and that no allowance was being made for changes in the utilization of such capital. The over-deflation issues was already alluded to in the discussion above; it was fed by the strong suspicion that the various available machinery and durable equipment price indexes did not take quality change into account adequately, if at all. This issue connects also to the "embodied" technical change idea (Solow, 1960) and the literature that flowed from it. My view on over-13 depreciation remains controversial (see Miller, 1983) . I myself turned early to the evidence of used machinery markets to point out that the official depreciation numbers were too high, that they were leading to an underestimate of actual capital accumulation, but I also argued that the observed depreciation rates in second-hand markets contain a large obsolescence component, induced by the rising quality of new machines. This depreciation is a valid subtraction from the present value of a machine in current prices but it is not the right concept to be used in the construction of a constant quality notion of the flow of services from the existing capital stock in "constant prices." The fact that new machines are better does not imply that the "real" flow of services available from the old machines has declined, either potentially or actually. The point is illustrated visually in Figure   1 , taken from the original 1963 paper which plots the information on different performance concepts for farm tractors as a function of their age. These data and my subsequent attempts to explore some of these issues econometrically (see especially Pakes and Griliches, 1984) all throw doubt on the current practice of assuming that the services of physical capital deteriorate at a rapid and fixed rate, independent of their age. But the available data on types of machinery in place and their actual age structure have been rather sparse, and there has been less progress in this direction than I think is desirable and might even be possible.
Iv
Several strands of this work came together in the 1967 joint paper with
Jorgenson on "The Explanation of Productivity Change," in an attempt at a more complete accounting of the sources of economic growth. Given its twentieth anniversary last year it may be worthwhile to review some of the issues raised there.
In 1967 we argued that a "correct" index number framework and the "right' measurement of inputs would reduce greatly the role of the "residual" including residential structures. There was also the uneasy issue of integrating a utilization adjustment within what was otherwise a pure equilibrium story. Once we conceded most of the utilization adjustment, our "explanation" of productivity growth shrank from 94 to 43 percent and with it also our claim to "do it all" (without mirrors).
I still believe, however, that we were right in our basic idea that productivity growth should be "explained" rather than just measured and that errors of measurement and concept have a major role in this. But we did not go far enough in that direction. We offered improved index number formulae, a better reweighting of capital input components, a major adjustment of the employment data for improvements in the quality of labor, revisions in investment price indexes, and estimates of changes in capital utilization.
The potential orders of magnitude of the adjustments based on the first two contributions, index number formulae and the reweighting of capital components, are not large enough to account for a major part of the observed "residual". The labor quality adjustment was not really controversial, but the capital price indexes and utilization adjustments deserve a bit more discussion. We argued for the idea that technical change could be thought of, in a sense, as being "embodied" in factor inputs, in new machines and human capital, and that a better measurement of these inputs via the nontautological route of hedonic index numbers for both capital and labor, could account for most of what was being interpreted as a "residual." It became clear, however, that without extending our framework further to allow for R&D and other externalities, increasing returns to scale and other disequilibria, we were unlikely to approach a full "explanation" of productivity change (see the last paragraphs of our "Reply to Denison": Jorgenson and Griliches 1972) .
It may appear that adjusting a particular input for misxneasured quality change would not have much of an effect on productivity growth measurement since one would need also to adjust the output figures for the corresponding industry. But as long as the share of this industry in final output is less than the elasticity of output with respect to this input, the two adjustments will not cancel themselves out. Since the share of investment in output is significantly lower than reasonable estimates of the share of capital in total factor costs, adjusting capital for mismeasurement of its prices does lead to a net reduction in the computed residual. Empirically it is clear that even without considering any of the potential externalities associated with new capital, there are enough questions about the official price indexes in these areas to make further work on this topic a high priority.
The utilization adjustment fit uneasily within the rather strict competitive equilibrium framework of the Jorgenson-Griliches paper. The analogy was made to labor hours, calling for the parallel concept of machine hours as the relevant notion of capital services. We had also in mind the model of a continuous process plant where output is more or less proportional to hours of operation. Since we were interested primarily in "productivity" change as a measure of "technical" change, a change that is due to changes in techniques of production, fluctuations in "utilization", whether a plant worked one shift or two, 10 months or 12, were not really relevant for this purpose.
But while labor unemployment was happening off-stage as far as business productivity accounts were concerned, capital "underemployment" was difficult to reconcile with the maximizing behavior with perfect foresight implicit in our framework.
There are two somewhat separate "utilization" issues. Productivity as measured is stongly pro-cyclical. Measured inputs, especially capital and labor services, fluctuate less than reported output. The resulting fluctuations in "productivity" do not make sense if we want to interpret them as a measure of the growth in the level of technology or the state of economically valuable knowledge of an economy. The U.S. economy did not "forget" four percent of its technology between 1974 and 1975. Nor was there a similar deterioration in the skill of its labor force. (National welfare did go down as the result of OPEC induced world-wide rise in energy prices, but that is a separate story.)
What is wrong with the productivity numbers in this case is that we do not measure accurately the actual amounts of labor or machine hours used rather than just paid for. Since both capital and labor are bought or hired in anticipation of a certain level of activity and on long term contracts, actual factor payments do not reflect their respective marginal products except in the case of perfect foresight and only in the long run. Under-utilization of factors of production is the result of unanticipated shifts in demand and various rigidities built into the economic system due to longer term explicit and implicit contracts (and other market imperfections) between worker and employer and seller and buyer. If our interest is primarily on the "technological" interpretation of productivity measures, we must either ignore such shorter run fluctuations or somehow adjust for them. This was the rationale behind our original use of energy consumed by electric motors (per installed horsepower) as a utilization adjustment.
We used energy consumption as a proxy for the unobserved variation in machine hours and not on its own behalf as an important intermediate input.
Used in the latter fashion it is a produced input which would cancel out at the aggregate level (as was pointed out by Denison in his comment on our paper).
Alternatively, one could adjust the weight (share) of capital services in one's total input index, to reflect the fact that underutilization of the existing stock of resources should' reduce significantly the shadow price of using them. (This is the approach suggested in erndt and Fuss , 1986).
Unfortunately, it is difficult to use the observed factor returns for these purposes, both because prices do not fall rapidly enough in the face of unanticipated demand shocks and because of a variety of longer run contractual factor payments arrangement which break the link between factor rewards and their current productivity.
This reflects, in a sense, the failure of the assumption of perfect competition which is the basis for much of the standard productivity accounts.
The actual world we live in is full of short-run rigidities, transaction costs, immalleable capital, and immobile resources, resulting in the pervasive presence of quasi-rents and short-term capital gains and losses. While I do not believe that such discrepancies from uperfectu competition actually imply the presence of a significant market power in most industries (as argued, for example, by Hall 1986), they do make productivity accounting even more difficult.
The other aspect of utilization is the longer run trend in shift-work, the length of the workweek, and changes in hours of operation per day by plants, stores, and service establishments. Consider, for example, a decline in overtime or night-shift premia due, say, to a decline in union power. This would reduce the price of a certain type of capital service and expand its use. If capital is not measured in machine hours, we would show a rise in productivity 18 even though there has been no "technological" change in methods of production.
I would prefer not to include such changes in the definition of productivity, since I interpret them as movements along (or towards) a stable production possibilities frontier. But there did occur an organizational change which allowed us to get more "flow," more hours per day or year, from a given stock of equipment or other resources. One way to look at this is to think of two types of activities: output production which rents machine and labor hours and the supply of capital services (and also effective labor hours) from the existing resource levels. A decline in over-time premia would be similar to a decline in the tariff on a certain kind of imported input. It would lead to an improvement in "efficiency" but not necessarily to a "technical" change.
It is still my belief that we need to adjust our data for such capacity utilization fluctuations for a better understanding of "technical" change, the issue that brought us to the analysis of such data in the first place. A consistent framework for such an adjustment will require, however, the introduction of adjustment costs and ex-post errors into the productivity measurement framework. (See Morrison, 1985 , and the literature cited there for recent developments in this area.) It is not clear, however, whether one can separate longer-run developments in the utilization of capital from changes in technology and the organization of society. Much of capital is employed outside continuous process manufacturing and there the connection between its utilization and productivity is much looser. The rising cost of human time and the desire for variety and flexibility have led to much investment in what might be called "standby" capacity with rather low utilization rates. The hi-fi system in my home is operating only at a fraction of its potential capacity. Much inventory is held in many businesses to economize on other aspects of labor activity. Nor is it clear that an extension of store hours with a resulting decline in productivity per squarefoot-hour of store space is necessarily a bad thing. Thus it is difficult to see how one could separate long run trends in utilization from changes in production and consumption technologies. It is, however, a topic worth studying and a potentially important contributor to "explanations" of apparent swings in the statistics on measured productivity.
Whether we include or exclude such changes from our "productivity" concept will affect our ability to "account" for them. But that is not the important issue. We do want to measure them, because we do want to understand what happened, to "explain" productivity. The rest is semantics.
Many of these problems arise because we do not disaggregate adequately and do not describe the production process in adequate detail. A model which would distinguish between the use of capital and labor at different times of the day and year and does not assume that their shadow prices are constant between different "hours" or over time, would be capable of handling these kind of shifts. We do not have the data to implement such a program but it underscores the message of our original paper: much of what passes for productivity change in conventional data is the result of aggregation errors, the wrong measurement of input quantities, and the use of wrong weights to combine them into "total factor input" indexes.
Something more should be said about the rather vague notions of "explanation" and "accounting". National Income accounts and associated index numbers are economic constructs, based on an implicit model of the economy and a variety of more or less persuasive logical and empirical arguments. It is not well adapted to "hypothesis testing" or debates about causality. In proposing a better measure of, say, labor, we rely on the evidence of market wage differentials. By bringing in more evidence on this topic we are not just reducing the "residual" tautologically. But the fact that it goes down as the result of such an adjustment does not make it right either. A different kind of evidence is required to provide a more persuasive justification for such adjustments. That is why I turned early on to the use of production functions for econometric testing. Without moving in such a direction one tends to run into various paradoxes. For example, capital growth accelerated in the 1970's in many industries without a comparable increase in the growth of output. In the index number sense of growth accounting, capital "explained" a larger fraction of the growth of output and we did, indeed, have a smaller residual. But in spite of this "accounting", the mystery only deepened.
The "econometric" approach to growth accounting involves one in the estimation of production functions. This allows one to test or validate a particular way of measuring an input or adjusting it for quality change; to estimate and test the role of left-out public good inputs such as R&D and other externality generating activities; to estimate economies of scale; and
to check on the possibility of disequilibria and estimate the deviation of "true" output elasticities from their respective factor shares. Production function estimation raises many problems of its own, including issues of aggregation, errors of measurement and simultaneity, but it is one of the few ways available to us for checking the validity of the suggested attributions of productivity growth to its various "sources".
My work on agricultural productivity (Griliches 1963 and 1964a) which used production function estimation as its main organizing device, left me 22 with the conviction that education, investment in research, and economies of scale (both at the level of the firm and at the level of the market) were the important sources of productivity growth in the long run. Since in the paper with Jorgenson we had not allowed for the two latter sources of growth, I was not too surprised or disheartened when it turned out that we could not really explain all of aggregate productivity change by formula and labor and capital quality adjustments alone. It was clear, however, that one would need more and better data to make such additional adjustments more reliable and convincing. I turned, therefore, to trying to aitass more data and more evidence on these topics, especially the measurement of the contribution of education (Criliches 1977) and the role of R&D (Griliches 1984 and .
Even though we now have more data, more advanced econometric technology, and better computer resources, the overall state of this field has not advanced all that much in the last twenty years. We are really not much closer to an "explanation" of the observed changes in the various productivity indexes.
A tremendous effort was launched by Jorgenson and his co-workers (Christensen, Fraumeni, Gollop, Nishimizu, and others) to improve and systematize the relevant data sources, to produce and analyze a consistent set of industry level total factor productivity accounts, to extend and generalize our original labor quality adjustments, and to extend all of this also to international comparisons of productivity. In the process, however, rather than pursuing the possibly hopeless quest for a complete "explanation" of productivity growth, they chose to focus instead on developing more precise and detailed productivity measures at various levels of aggregation and devising statistical models for their analysis. Denison (1974 and 1979) , in parallel, was pursuing his quest for a more complete accounting of the sources of growth, putting together as many reasonable scraps of information as were available, but not embedding them in a clear theoretical framework or an econometrically testable setting. The incompleteness of both approaches and the unsatisfactory state of this field as a whole was revealed by the sharp and prolonged slowdown in the growth of measured productivity which began in the mid-seventies. Despite the best attempts of these and other researchers, it has not been possible to account for this slowdown within the standard growth accounting framework without concluding that the "residual" had changed, that the underlying total factor productivity growth rate fell sometime in the late 1960's or early 1970's. (See Denison 1984 , Griliches 1980 and 1988 , Kendrick 1983 , and many others).
I do not believe, however, that this slowdown can be interpreted to imply that the underlying rate of technical change has slowed down, that we have exhausted our technological frontiers. In my opinion, it was caused by misguided macro policies induced by the oil price shocks and the subsequent inflation and the fears thereof. Without allowing for errors in capital accumulation (which continued initially at a rather high rate, in spite of the sharp declines in aggregate demand) and widespread underutilization of capacity, it is not possible to interpret the conventional productivity statistics. Surely "knowledge" did not retreat. Moreover, I do not believe that one can use statistics from such periods to infer anything about longer term technological trends. If we are not close to our production possibilities frontier, we cannot tell what is happening to it and whether the underlying growth rate of an economy's "potential" has slowed down or not. We need a better articulated theoretical framework, one that would allow for long term factor substitution and short term rigidities and errors, before we shall be able to understand better what has happened to us recently. We also need better data, especially on output and input prices and various aspects of labor and capital utilization. for its support of this work over the last thirty years. A significant portion of this paper has been adopted from the Introduction to the forthcoming collection of my early papers (Griliches 1988b ).
